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enlargement is explored. The impact of the enlargement on the EU, new member states, and world grains markets 
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1. Introduction  
At the end of 2003, the European Union (EU) concluded its negotiations with ten candidate 
countries
1, and in 2004 it accomplished its largest enlargement process in terms of the number of 
countries, area, and population. This development is significant for the world grains markets as not only 
the EU has been a major player both as an importer and an exporter, but also agricultural sector is 
critically important in the new member states.  
The agricultural sector of the new member states generates a higher percentage of the GDP and 
employs a larger portion of the labor force relative to the EU. However, the structural inefficiency in the 
farms, a reminiscent of collectivization after the World War 2, has lead to low agricultural output levels in 
these countries, which were once considered the “bread basket” of Europe. Financial and capital 
constraints did not help, and lowered yields as they limited the purchase of inputs by farmers. For 
example, the wheat yield in the Czech Republic has been on average 24 percent lower than the average 
EU level in the last ten years. This ratio is 45 percent for Hungary and 64 percent for Poland. The average 
yield of corn in Czech Republic is 65 percent lower than the EU average; it is 76 percent lower in 
Hungary and 65 percent lower in Poland. The yield gaps are much higher for the remaining new member 
states. Although the yield levels have started converging towards the EU levels in the recent years, there 
is still much potential to be realized in the new member states.  
Many instruments of the common agricultural policy (CAP) of the EU, such as direct payments to 
farmers, are expected to benefit the agricultural producers of the new member states, and increase their 
production and exports. With the accession to the EU, not only agricultural and trade policies of new 
member states will be uniformized with the EU, but also they will benefit from other externalities. These 
benefits are technology transfer from the EU-15 members, an increase in the flow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to their countries, and acceleration of the restructuring of their agricultural and food 
sectors. However, it should be noted that the net change in social welfare of new member states from the 
enlargement depends on multiple factors: the change in producer surplus, the change in consumer welfare, 
                                                 
1 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia   2 
and the change in the export subsidy expenditures. The net change of social welfare for the new member 
states can either be positive or negative depending on the direction and the relative magnitudes of these 
changes. The changes in producer surplus, consumer welfare, and export subsidies in turn depend on the 
extent of the technology transfer and the supply response it generates. With a technology transfer-induced 
supply shift, producers will produce and export more, increasing the export subsidy expenditures. This in 
turn will decrease the net welfare gains for the new member states. Thus, when evaluating the impacts of 
the enlargement process on the new members’ economy, a comprehensive calculation of the change in 
social welfare needs to be carried out.  
That is why; we need to look at the literature on immiserizing growth while discussing the net 
welfare effects of the enlargement on the new member states. Bhagwati (1958) reintroduced the concept 
of immiserizing growth, i.e. technical progress may reduce social welfare through adverse effects on the 
terms of trade in an economy. Johnson (1967) showed that growth could be immiserizing due to trade 
policy distortions even when the terms of trade do not change. Alston and Martin (1995) showed how the 
size and the distribution of benefits from research-induced supply shift depend on the nature of the supply 
shift, the nature of any market-distorting policies, and the terms of trade effects arising from technology 
transfer.  
  In this context, the first objective of this study is to project the impacts of the enlargement on the 
EU, new member states, and world grains markets. In the next step, the welfare effects for the new 
member states under alternative technology transfer scenarios are calculated to test if immiserizing 
growth will occur.  
To this end, the analysis provided in this work considers multiple technology transfer scenarios. 
In the first scenario that is used as a benchmark, no technology transfer is assumed and these new 
members maintain the yield growth rates before they joined the EU. This benchmark scenario 
incorporates the EU enlargement and the CAP reform. In the next scenario, technology transfer is 
included in the model that increases the yields to their potential level. There are different rates of 
technology transfer used in the study that gives rise to 3 scenarios: a low growth scenario, a modest   3 
growth scenario and a high growth scenario. The net welfare changes in each scenario is calculated and 
compared, to see whether there is a possibility of immiserizing growth.  
This study uses a multimarket non-spatial, partial-equilibrium model of world grains markets 
including wheat, corn, and barley markets for the EU, new member states, and other major countries 
and/or regions. Change in producer surplus is used to measure the welfare changes to producers resulting 
from technology transfer. The increase in export subsidy expenditures from higher exports is calculated as 
well. To obtain the change in consumer welfare, an incomplete demand system approach -LINQUAD- is 
used to compute equivalent variation of consumer price changes.  
Many studies done before and during the enlargement negotiations estimated the potential 
impacts of the enlargement on the EU and on world agricultural markets. In contrast, this study will 
implement the actual agreed upon framework rather than making assumptions on the terms of the 
enlargement. It will also include the latest changes in the agricultural policy through the CAP reform.  
  This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the impact of technology transfer on the grains 
markets in the new member states, describing the conditions under which immiserizing growth can occur. 
Section 3 discusses the modeling of technology transfer and its impact on yield, land, and supply of grains 
in the new member states. Section 4 discusses different channels through which technology transfer to 
new member states can take place. Section 5 describes the scenarios run under different technology 
transfer assumptions. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes.    
2. Grains Markets  
Figure 1 shows the impacts of technology transfer in the grains markets of the acceding countries. 
Panel (a) represents the domestic market, whereas panel (b) represents the export market. It shows the   4 
case for a large country exporter that has an export subsidy policy in place.
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Figure 1. Effects of technology transfer on production, prices, and exports of grains in the acceding 
countries  
 
In panel (a), point A denotes the autarky equilibrium. Point B represents the autarky equilibrium 
when supply shifts in the new member states with the technology transfer after accession to the EU. The 
domestic price that is denoted by PD
0 decreases to PD
1 with increased supply. Supply (S0) shifts to S1 with 
the technology transfer, which is shown here as a pivotal shift.  
The export market is represented in panel (b) where ED denotes excess demand without export 
subsidy and EDS denotes excess demand with export subsidy. The amount of export subsidy used before 
technology transfer is the rectangle (PD
0ECPW
0) where P W
0 shows the world price before the supply shift. 
In the export market, the excess supply (ES0) shifts to ES1 after the technology transfer, changing the 
export subsidy amount to the rectangle shown by (PD
1FDPW
1). Although the supply shift in the domestic 
market is pivotal, the supply shift in the export market is nearly parallel.  
The welfare changes in the new member states from the technology transfer scenario can be 
summarized as follows. The change in consumer surplus is equal to the area denoted by (PD
0JLPD
1), 
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which is positive. The change in producer surplus is equal to the difference in the areas, i.e. (PD
1MN) – 
(PD
0KN), which can be either positive or negative. The increase in export subsidy expenditure is equal to 
the area (CDFE), which is positive. The net welfare change is equal to the change in consumer surplus 
plus the change in producer surplus minus the change in export subsidy. This net change in welfare can be 
positive or negative, depending on the relative magnitude of its components. If it is negative, then 
immiserizing growth occurs, i.e. the country is worse off after a supply increase due to technological 
improvement. If it is positive, then the country benefits from the technology transfer. It should be noted 
that in the scenario analysis, the additional burden of tax costs for each country is not considered, as the 
budget allocated to the export subsidy is a part of the EU-25 budget, and it is not an easy task to 
differentiate how much each country contributes to the specific cost of export subsidy.  
It is crucial to note that the nature of the supply shift and the size and the nature of the trade 
distortion will determine whether there will be “immiserizing growth” or not. Alston and Martin (1995) 
discuss a set of conditions under which technological change can be immiserizing. In panel (a), a pivotal 
supply shift is illustrated. In this case, there is a possibility of immiserizing growth even without trade 
distortion as the change in producer surplus can be either positive or negative. If the supply shift had been 
parallel, then producers would have benefited alongside the consumers, unless there is a trade distortion, 
such as export subsidies.
3  
The possibility of immiserizing growth further increases when we introduce the export market 
and the export subsidy into the analysis. In this case, there is a cost of export subsidy that needs to be 
considered in the calculation of net welfare of the society. As seen in panel (b), the export subsidy cost 
increases with a supply shift as the producers export more and receive higher subsidies. Thus, net benefits 
from technology transfer are lower when there are export subsidies, in some cases even negative, hence 
the “immiserizing growth”.  
 
                                                 
3 See Bhagwati (1958) and Johnson (1958) for a discussion of immiserizing growth in the absence of distortions, 
when demand is inelastic.   6 
3. Modeling the Technology Transfer 
  In order to model and evaluate the impact of technology transfer in the acceding countries, first a 
multi-market non-spatial, partial-equilibrium model of world grains markets is set up. The model includes 
wheat, corn, and barley markets for the EU, the new member states, and other major countries and/or 
regions.  
In the next step, the impact of technology transfer on an agricultural production function of each 
commodity in each new member state is analyzed. The supply in the corn market of each acceding 
country, denoted by CS , is written as  C C y L CS × = , where  C L  is land allocated to corn production, 
and  C y  is production per hectare for corn (yield). The profit per hectare function is  ) , ( I C P P p p = , 
where  C P  is the price of corn and  I P  is the price of an aggregate input. A normalized quadratic profit 
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T q b m g f a p , where f  is the coefficient of unit profit increase 
due to technology transfer,  ) (T m  is the coefficient of unit yield increase due to technology transfer, and 
) (T q  is the coefficient of yield change due to technology transfer.
4 Thus, the new production per hectare 
for corn is  
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where 
T
C y  is the new yield for corn after the technology transfer.  
There are three different types of supply shifts that might occur depending on the values of  ) (T m  
and  ) (T q : the first case occurs when  1 ) ( > T m  and  1 ) ( > T q , where both the intercept and the slope of 
the yield function changes. The second case occurs when  1 ) ( > T m  and  1 ) ( = T q , where only the 
intercept of the yield function changes, and in this case the supply shift is parallel. The third case occurs 
when  1 ) ( = T m  and  1 ) ( > T q , where only the slope of the yield function changes, and in this case the 
supply shift is pivotal.
5 
In the technology transfer scenarios, the third case is considered for the supply shift. In this case, 
the new yield function becomes 
* ) ( C
T
C P T y × × + = q b g . While implementing the technology transfer 
scenarios, the value of  ) (T q  is calculated for each scenario depending on the desired growth rate of yield 
for crops. 
To determine the supply for corn, the next step is to identify the land equation. The equation for 
land allocated to corn is written as  
B B C C B C B C y P y P L L × × + × × + = × + × + = =
* * ) , ( r d l p r p d l p p   (3)  
where  B P  and  B y denote the price and yield of the complementary crops respectively. Technology 
transfer influences the land allocated to corn through its direct impact on yields and its indirect impact on 
prices.  
  Combining equations 1 and 3, the corn supply before technology transfer is derived as 
) ( ) (
* * *
C B B C C P y P y P CS × + × × × + × × + = b g r d l     (4) 
  Using equations 2 and 3, the corn supply after technology transfer is derived as    
                                                 
5 See below for a discussion of the impact of the nature of supply shifts on the possibility of immiserizing growth.    8 






C C P T y P y P CS × × + × × × + × × + = q b g r d l   (5) 
4. Sources of Technology Transfer and Yield Growth  
In this study, the focus is on yield improvements in wheat, barley, and corn production in the 
acceding countries to the EU. The benchmark scenario against which the results of growth scenarios are 
compared also incorporates the EU enlargement and the CAP reform. The reason for incorporating the 
enlargement is to be able to isolate the impacts of technology transfer on production, prices and export 
subsidies in the acceding countries.  
  Different channels have been described in the literature in terms of the sources of technology 
transfer from EU to the Central and Eastern European countries that will increase the productivity of the 
farming systems, and therefore the yields. The first and the most often cited channel is the replacement of 
the technically obsolete machinery and equipment. The prices and the availability of machinery and 
equipment widely differ between the new member states and the EU countries. For example, Heinrich 
(2001) gives a comparison of Hungary and Germany in terms of the number of tractors and gross 
investments of machinery. He notes that, in terms of inputs, an average Hungarian farm roughly uses 
three-quarters of the tractors used by its German counterpart in 2000. Gross investments for machinery 
are more than three-fold for a German farm compared to a Hungarian farm in Euros per hectare units for 
2000. These data show the potential for machinery use and investment for technical equipment in the new 
member states that has not been yet realized. This is especially true when productivities of machinery for 
wheat production are compared. In Hungary, the productivity of machinery is 8.9 (100 kg/hour) which is 
nearly half of that in Germany which is 16.4 (Heinrich 2001). Although a Hungarian farm can work with 
less machinery than the German farm because of different climate factors, the gap in the productivity 
shows the potential gains from new and improved machinery.     
Purchases of new machinery and equipment will be possible as the financial situation of the 
farmers in the new member states will improve considerably with the enlargement. Through imports of 
newly built machinery from EU or other Western countries, not only the productivity of farms will   9 
increase, but also the costs of repair and maintenance will decrease. Pawlak and Muzalewski (2001) note 
that the share of imported new-built tractors from Western countries increased from 0.3 per cent in 1995 
to 6.1 per cent in 2000 in Poland. Higher farm income combined with the increased trade relations with 
the other EU members will possibly increase this ratio.  
  The other possible channel of technology transfer is through the seed markets. Duczmal (2001) 
reports that the number of seed varieties in the “National List of Varieties” of countries in transition 
almost doubled in the last decade, and the proportion of domestic varieties in this list decreased. A similar 
trend was detected among cereals in the same period, where the proportion of domestic varieties 
decreased as well.  
International seed companies entered Central and Eastern European markets, and have well-
organized ‘transfer of technology’ systems. Turi (2001) reports the increased activities of multinational 
corporations in Hungary, and the increased usage of foreign varieties. He also notes that Hungary’s 
hybrid corn seed improvement comes from multinational corporations’ investments. Although Hungary 
already had well-established links with the Western countries through seed production and seed trading 
activities, these links have been renewed and strengthened in the past decade. Another channel for yield 
improvement has been biotechnology that has been introduced into Central and Eastern Europe for some 
time. Field trials of transgenic crops started in multiple countries such as in Czech Republic for corn 
(Heffer 2001).   
  The next channel, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), such as Pioneer’s in Hungary, is critical in 
the transfer of modern technology. However, not all Central and Eastern European countries are equally 
attractive to FDI. Although concentration has been mostly in Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland 
(Josling et al. 1997), acceding to the EU will increase the attractiveness of the new member states, and 
may increase FDI and the resulting technology transfer from it.   
  In this context, it is beneficial to refer to Pouliquen’s (2001) extensive study on the relative 
competitiveness and farm incomes in the Central and Eastern European agri-food sectors. He claims that 
the relative low yields in these countries are the result of low use of bought inputs. He notes that with the   10 
exception of Slovenia, the main inputs bought for production of crops are utilized 2 to 3 times fewer per 
agricultural hectare compared to the EU. He also shows that the level of capital invested per worker is 
lower in these countries than the French level, which is an acceptable approximation for the EU. In terms 
of implications of the enlargement, he claims that the overall productivity in agri-food sectors will 
probably increase more from technological progress than from price rises, with the exception of rye. 
However, he also points out that the structures of small- and medium-sized semi-subsistence holdings 
may prevent farmers from realizing these productivity gains. He also notes that farmers in new member 
states will receive higher incomes as a result of direct payments from EU, which in turn will increase 
productivity and production. However, this is on the condition that these higher incomes are used for 
investment rather than consumption or absorbed in land price increases.  
5. Technology Transfer Scenarios 
The average grain yields in the EU define the potential for the grain yields in the new member 
states. In terms of historical perspective, Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
were net food exporters early in this century. In the pre-socialist period, average yields in the Eastern 
Europe were only slightly lower than those in the Western Europe. Tyers (1993) gives example of Poland 
where the average yield of wheat was equal to its counterpart in Western Europe, whereas yield of barley 
was slightly below it.  
There are a couple of reasons for the lower yields in the new member states. One of them is the 
transition to market economy which started in 1989, and included de-subsidization, de-collectivization, 
privatization, and price liberalization in the agricultural sector. These structural changes are accounted for 
the low yield levels in the grains sector as they have contributed to the lack of finance in the agricultural 
sector, as well as less use of inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides etc. Thus, when estimating the yield 
growth after the enlargement, the growth in yields from technology transfer needs to be separated from 
the increase in yields that is expected to originate from input use due to higher income of farmers.    
To correctly assess the yield growth for the grains is critical in determining the impact of 
technology transfer on production, prices, and exports. To this end, previous literature provides guidance.   11 
Tyers (1993) utilizes 3 growth and productivity scenarios for post-socialist economies. The first one is a 
benchmark against which other scenarios can be compared. The other two scenarios are “low growth” and 
“high growth”. In the “low growth scenario”, there is no technology catch-up and the growth rates settle 
down to their pre-reform values after a decline. In the “high growth” scenario, wheat yields increase 10 
per cent over the benchmark, and coarse grain yields increase 5 per cent over the benchmark. However, 
Tyers’ work does not incorporate a possible EU enlargement, and underestimates the potential for 
technology transfer that might be brought on by it.  
  In this study, 3 different technology transfer scenarios are run. The first one is a “low growth” 
scenario, in which wheat, corn, and barley yields increase by 5 per cent in 3 years (2004-2006) for all 
countries. In the “modest growth” scenario, all 3 commodities’ yields increase by 10 per cent over 3 
years, and in the “high growth” scenario, the increase is 15 per cent. In all 3 scenarios, stocks are kept 
constant at their benchmark levels, as an increase in stocks might be reduced by an increase in export 
subsidies and exports. Wheat and coarse grain markets are modeled separately for the 3 biggest players, 
Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic. The other 7 new member states are grouped together.   
It should also be noted that the potential for each country depends on its climate conditions, soil 
conditions etc. Thus, the yield growth that can be brought upon by technology transfer may not be unique 
but may differ from country to country, and also from commodity to commodity. The differences are hard 
to predict and to model. Thus, a constant growth rate among countries and crops has been assumed.  
6. Measuring Welfare Changes 
To calculate welfare changes, a benchmark is established by solving the model with no 
technology transfer assumption. Then each scenario is evaluated under different assumptions of 
technology transfer relative to this benchmark using producer surplus (PS), equivalent variation (EV), and 
export subsidy expenditure (ES).
6  
 
                                                 
6 All 3 welfare calculations are computed at the year 2013 which is the marketing year that starts in 2013 and ends in 
2014.    12 
Producer Surplus 





) ( dx x L PS x         (6) 
where p ˆ  represents the profits after the technology transfer and p  represents the benchmark profits 
before the technology transfer for each country and commodity.  x L  is the land allocated to the specific 
commodity.  
Consumer Welfare 
  Equivalent variation (EV) is used to measure the change in consumer welfare. An incomplete 
demand system approach (LINQUAD) (LaFrance (1998), LaFrance et al. (2002), Agnew (1998), Beghin 
et al. (2003) and Beghin et al. (2004)) is used as it allows an exact welfare measure to be derived from it.  
First, a representative consumer with an expenditure function  ) , ( U P f e = is assumed where  P  is 
a vector of consumer prices,  ) , , ( OG B C P P P P = , and U denotes utility. In the example below, the focus is 
on a two-good case of the utility function, corn and barley. Each country has a different consumption 
equation for each commodity, and the EV calculation has been adjusted for each case.  C P  is the price of 
corn,  B P  is the price of barley,  OG P is the price of all other goods that is included for completeness, and 
M denotes income.    
The Marshallian demands for corn and barley, denoted by CDand  BD respectively, are derived 
as follows:  
) 5 . 0 5 . 0 ( ) , , (
2 2
B B C C B B C C C C C C B C P P P P M x P M P P CD × × - × × - × - × - × + × + = n n x x n x   (7) 
and  
) 5 . 0 5 . 0 ( ) , , (
2 2
B B C C B B C C B B B B B C P P P P M x P M P P BD × × - × × - × - × - × + × + = n n x x n x   (8) 
for all countries.    13 
In the next step, the following system of equations is solved with the above two equations to 
obtain the parameters  C C C B B B x x , , , , , n x n x .  
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The solution allows to exactly identify all cross-price responses to the system as  n x, and  x are 
then known parameters. Based on equations 7 and 8, the EV is derived as   
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
0 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 exp ) ( 5 . 0 ) ( 5 . 0 B B C C B B C C B B C C B B C C P x P x P x P x P P P P M EV × + × + × + × - * × × - × × - × - × - = n n x x
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2 0 2 0 0 0 ) ( 5 . 0 ) ( 5 . 0 B B C C B B C C P P P P M × × - × × - × - × - - n n x x         (13) 
where 0 and 1 denote the initial and the final prices respectively.    
Export Subsidy 
  An effective export subsidy rate is calculated for each commodity for the EU by using the latest 
available value of export subsidy expenditure and the FOB values of exports for that year.  
Per unit export subsidy rate = ( )
) (EX
ER          (14) 
where ER denotes value of export refunds (export subsidy expenditures), and  EX denotes value of 
exports (FOB price times total exports). This subsidy rate is used for each new member state to calculate 
their respective export subsidy expenditures and the change after each scenario. Thus, the total export 
subsidy expenditure gets evenly distributed with respect to the export shares of each country for each   14 
commodity. The export subsidy expenditure for each country and commodity is calculated by multiplying 
the export subsidy rate with the FOB price of the commodity and the third-country
7 exports.  
7. Results 
  The preliminary results for the 3 technology transfer scenarios are presented in Tables 1-3. Tables 
1A through 1C show the welfare effects from the first scenario that incorporates a growth rate of 5 per 
cent for wheat, corn, and barley yields over the benchmark scenario. For all 3 commodities, the benefits 
of technology transfer outweigh the costs from it, as the sum of producer surplus and equivalent variation 
exceeds the change in export subsidy. Thus, all countries benefit from the yield growth of all commodities 
considered in this scenario. Tables 2A through 2C show the welfare impacts of a 10 per cent growth in 
yields of wheat, corn, and barley. Tables 3A through 3C present the welfare impacts of a 15 per cent 
growth in yields of wheat, corn, and barley. In these scenarios, as well, the benefits of technology transfer 
and yield growth outweigh the costs incurred from it. Therefore, it can be concluded that no matter which 
rate of technology transfer is assumed in this study, the acceding countries’ welfare increases because of 
technology transfer and yield growth, in the grains sector. However, it should also be noted that the 
increase in export subsidies is positive in most cases, and therefore the burden of higher export subsidies 
must be taken into consideration while evaluating the welfare effects of technology transfer in acceding 
countries. 
  These results also show that the magnitudes of the producer surplus in the acceding countries 
depend on the country’s potential. For example, Hungary benefits the most from an increase in the yield 
of corn, a commodity in which it has a large production capacity and has been a traditional net exporter. 
This is also true for the Czech Republic and Poland for the case of wheat, for which the producer 
surpluses were the highest with respect to other commodities.  
As the producer surplus in all commodities for all countries in each scenario is positive, the only 
remaining option available for the immiserizing growth to happen was to have a large enough negative 
impact through a large increase in export subsidies. However, the increases in export subsidies of all 
                                                 
7 Third-country exports include exports to all countries except EU-15 and the 10 new member states.    15 
commodities were below the sum of producer surplus and equivalent variation. One of the reasons for this 
result was that, although the increases in production and exports were considerable, not all exports were 
subsidized. The export subsidy rates for the EU was used to compute the export subsidy expenditures in 
the acceding countries, and these rates are less than 1, specifically 4.5% for wheat, 22.8% for corn, and 
44.1% for barley.        
8. Conclusions   
The objective of this study is to explore the possibility of immiserizing growth in the grain sectors 
of the acceding countries to the EU. To this end, a multi-market non-spatial, partial-equilibrium model of 
world grains markets for the EU, new member states, and other major countries and/or regions is used. 
First, a benchmark scenario is set up that incorporates the EU enlargement and the CAP reform with no 
technology transfer. Then, multiple scenarios that include different rates of technology transfer to the 
acceding countries from the EU are run. Technology transfer is incorporated into the model in the form of 
an increase in yields of wheat, corn and barley over the benchmark scenario. The resulting welfare effects 
in the acceding countries from this technology transfer in the grains sector are computed.  
The preliminary results show that the net welfare effects of technology transfer is positive for all 
the acceding countries in all commodities. Although the increase in export subsidy expenditures of the 
acceding countries is positive in most cases, it is not large enough to obtain a negative welfare effect. The 
sum of producer surplus and equivalent variation exceeds the increase in export subsidy expenditure in all 
cases.   
It should be noted that the gain of producers in the form of producer surplus depends on the 
relative potential of each commodity, in other words producers gained the most in commodities they 
already produced the most although the growth rate of yields were kept constant across commodities in 
each scenario.  
There are two points that need to be discussed while interpreting the above results. The first one 
is the usage of an export subsidy rate while calculating the export subsidy expenditures of the acceding 
countries. The subsidy rate for each commodity in EU is calculated based on the latest available data, and   16 
used across all the acceding countries to be consistent, which in turn resulted in an even distribution of 
export subsidies to acceding countries with respect to their export shares. However, some of the acceding 
countries had export subsidies prior to the enlargement, and ambiguity about their future utilization has 
prompted the above methodology. Thus, the utilization of export subsidies by the new member states after 
joining the EU may differ from the one described in this study. In future research, a more recent 
description of the export subsidy policies in the new member states will be incorporated into the 
technology transfer scenarios.  
  The second point is the assumption of same yield increases across commodities and across 
countries in each scenario. The rate of increase in yields may not be the same across commodities, as the 
level of investment by domestic producers and by multinational corporations may differ for each 
commodity as the profitability of each commodity may differ. The agro-ecological conditions of the new 
member states differ from each other, as well. This may not only introduce different rates of yield 
increase across countries for the same crop, but also across commodities in the same country. Although 
projections of technology transfer in acceding countries is difficult as it depends on multiple factors, in 
the future research more attention will be paid to different potential of each commodity and country in 
terms of ability to benefit from technology transfer from the EU.  
This study explores the possibility of immiserizing growth in the grain sectors of the new member 
states after acceding to the EU. The possibility of technology transfer and the use of export subsidies, 
hence trade distortion, create the conditions which may lead to immiserizing growth, i.e. a negative net 
welfare change after technological improvement. The results show that this is not the case, and that all 
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TABLE 1.A. Welfare effects of technology transfer scenarios in 1000 US dollars at 1995 prices 
(2013/14) for Wheat 
 
      Scenario 1 
Country  Change in PS  EV  Change in ES 
Czech Republic  450.78  4.26  7.42 
Hungary  247.60  2.83  3.32 
Poland  629.76  7.02  1.49 
Other NMS*  347.66  4.41  8.54 
* Other NMS are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Note: Scenario 1 incorporates 5% growth rate in yields by 2006.  
 
TABLE 1.B. Welfare effects of technology transfer scenarios in 1000 US dollars at 1995 prices 
(2013/14) for Corn 
 
      Scenario 1 
Country  Change in PS  EV  Change in ES 
Czech Republic  116.54  0.09  0 
Hungary  455.66  0.36  22.5 
Poland  282.94  0.07  0 
Other NMS*  125.48  0.35  10.29 
* Other NMS are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Note: Scenario 1 incorporates 5% growth rate in yields by 2006.  
 
TABLE 1.C. Welfare effects of technology transfer scenarios in 1000 US dollars at 1995 prices 
(2013/14) for Barley 
 
      Scenario 1 
Country  Change in PS  EV  Change in ES 
Czech Republic  239.28  3.85  45.74 
Hungary  56.06  1.06  4.25 
Poland  173.51  2.48  0 
Other NMS*  208.73  3.15  40.03 
* Other NMS are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
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TABLE 2.A. Welfare effects of technology transfer scenarios in 1000 US dollars at 1995 prices 
(2013) for Wheat 
 
      Scenario 2 
Country  Change in PS  EV  Change in ES 
Czech Republic  913.31  10.08  14.73 
Hungary  499.94  6.70  6.64 
Poland  1269.18  16.60  1.49 
Other NMS*  707.41  10.42  17.22 
* Other NMS are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Note: Scenario 2 incorporates 10% growth rate in yields by 2006.  
 
TABLE 2.B. Welfare effects of technology transfer scenarios in 1000 US dollars at 1995 prices 
(2013) for Corn 
 
      Scenario 2 
Country  Change in PS  EV  Change in ES 
Czech Republic  235.41  0.23  0 
Hungary  911.99  0.88  45.07 
Poland  572.11  0.18  0 
Other NMS*  255.27  0.86  10.27 
* Other NMS are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Note: Scenario 2 incorporates 10% growth rate in yields by 2006. 
 
TABLE 2.C. Welfare effects of technology transfer scenarios in 1000 US dollars at 1995 prices 
(2013) for Barley 
 
      Scenario 2 
Country  Change in PS  EV  Change in ES 
Czech Republic  480.37  7.81  90.71 
Hungary  112.01  2.16  8.44 
Poland  347.05  5.04  0 
Other NMS*  420.55  6.40  79.95 
* Other NMS are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia. 





   19 
TABLE 3.A. Welfare effects of technology transfer scenarios in 1000 US dollars at 1995 prices 
(2013) for Wheat 
 
      Scenario 3 
Country  Change in PS  EV  Change in ES 
Czech Republic  1378.86  15.41  26.33 
Hungary  752.68  10.24  9.97 
Poland  1916.75  25.38  1.48 
Other NMS*  1069.92  15.93  26.02 
* Other NMS are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Note: Scenario 3 incorporates 15% growth rate in yield by 2006.  
 
TABLE 3.B. Welfare effects of technology transfer scenarios in 1000 US dollars at 1995 prices 
(2013) for Corn  
 
      Scenario 3 
Country  Change in PS  EV  Change in ES 
Czech Republic  234.29  0.36  7.85 
Hungary  1361.51  5.91  65.36 
Poland  864.21  0.29  0 
Other NMS*  386.07  1.32  10.16 
* Other NMS are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Note: Scenario 3 incorporates 15% growth rate in yield by 2006. 
 
TABLE 3.C. Welfare effects of technology transfer scenarios in 1000 US dollars at 1995 prices 
(2013) for Barley  
 
      Scenario 3 
Country  Change in PS  EV  Change in ES 
Czech Republic  719.37  12.01  151.45 
Hungary  167.18  8.39  12.51 
Poland  518.61  7.76  0 
Other NMS*  630.27  9.84  119.40 
* Other NMS are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
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